Second, the Task Force highlights the potential value of PBRSAs in reducing uncertainty through additional data collection. As the report notes, a PBRSA is perhaps best thought of as a "mechanism for reducing uncertainty through greater investment in evidence collection while a technology is in use within a health care system." The intention is to provide a different distribution of risk between the payer and the manufacturer compared with the historical relationship between the parties.
Furthermore, PBRSAs can reduce uncertainty through data collection related to product effectiveness in various ways. For example, they might address broader populations than those used in registration trials, or collect evidence on end points not considered in trials, such as adherence, hospitalization, or longer term clinical outcomes. As the report notes, which PBRSA research design is most suitable in any given situation will depend on the nature and type of the uncertainty that the evidence collection is trying to address.
Third, the Task Force highlights that PBRSAs have "public good" aspects, which should be considered from a policy perspective. In part that means that public authorities who negotiate and fund evidence-generating arrangements should make the results of that research public where possible. But the Task Force goes further, pointing out that private insurers, who seek valid scientific answers to the outcomes questions embedded in the arrangements, should also be encouraged to put findings in the public domain, as long as it does not deter them from negotiating agreement in the first place.
Importantly, the Task Force argues that the societal desirability of PBRSAs is fundamentally a value-of-information question, comparing the societal costs of additional data collection with the societal benefits of improved resource-allocation decisions. Moreover, the report adds that as an innovation in and of them, PBRSAs should also be evaluated from a long-run societal perspective in terms of their impact on dynamic efficiency (eliciting the optimal amount of innovation).
Finally, the Task Force highlights research and operational "good practices," emphasizing issues related to design, implementation, evaluation, and governance. It notes that outcome measures should be selected with care, that they should be clear, measurable, objective, realistically achievable, and relevant. Ideally, this means that parties should address a series of questions before entering into agreements: What is the specific research design? Is the time horizon realistic? Is the funding arrangement clear? Who is responsible for data collection and analysis? What is the process for reviewing and analyzing the evidence in order to make a revised decision on price, revenue, or coverage? Will discounts or rebates be paid on the basis of provisional results? The Task Force adds that to the extent possible, certain matters should be prespecified, including arrangements about access to data, opportunities for stakeholder input, rules about reporting of results, and so forth.
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Where PBRSAs are on their adoption curve is unclear. The Task Force's discussion of experience with the agreements in different countries indicates a great deal of interest and ongoing experimentation, suggesting that the model may be in a protracted but early stage of evolution. Whether they truly take off or muddle along in the years ahead remains to be seen. Whatever the outcomes, the work of the PBRSA Task Force will sharpen the debate and solidify the foundation.
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